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Impact of Rural Employment Guarantee Schemes on Seasonal 
Labor Markets: Optimum Compensation and Workers’ Welfare
* 
 
The recent enactment of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in India has been 
widely hailed a policy that provides a safety net for the rural poor with the potential to boost 
rural income, stabilize agricultural production and reduce rural-urban migration. This paper, 
models the impact of such employment guarantee schemes in the context of an agrarian 
economy characterized by lean season involuntary unemployment as a consequence of tied-
labor contracts. Specifically, we examine labor and output market responses to a productive 
rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) and determine the optimal compensation to 
public work employees consistent with the objectives of (i) productive efficiency in agriculture 
and (ii) welfare maximization of the laborers. Our framework provides a theoretical framework 
for the evaluation of a number of (sometimes) conflicting observations and empirical results 
on the impact of an EGS on agricultural wages, employment and output, and underscores the 
importance of the relative productivity of workers in the EGS program vis-à-vis their 
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the structure of labor markets in developing countries. 1 Introduction
Guaranteed employment at a pre determined wage aimed at providing income security to the
otherwise unemployed has been a longstanding staple policy for governments worldwide. Start 
ing with the Poor Employment Act of 1817 in Britain, and later on the New Deal Programs
in the United States in the 1930s, government intervention in the labor market as an employer
of the last resort has been adopted as an integral feature of labor market policies in many
developing countries over the last few decades (Lipton, 1996). Recent examples of the latter
include public work programs in India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Philippines, Egypt, Botswana,
Kenya and Chile (Subbarao, 1999; Lipton, 1996).
Amongst developing countries, no public works program has been empirically studied as exten 
sively as the Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) in the State of Maharashtra, India1. It is
not surprising, therefore, that the recent enactment of the National Rural Employment Guaran 
tee Act of India in 2005 (since renamed the The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act) has generated renewed interest in the eﬀectiveness of EGS programs to provide
an economic safety net to the rural poor. The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
(NREGS) following the Act of 2005 has, with minor modiﬁcations, broadened the coverage and
enacted into law the EGS in existence since the 1960’s in the State of Maharashtra in India.
In turn, the origins of the Maharashtra EGS in India and its’ counterpart, the Rural Public
Works (RPW) program in Bangladesh can be traced back to the Famine Codes established in
British India in the 1880’s where direct action in the form of public work programs was the
central feature of famine relief strategy.
It is now widely recognized that labor market interventions through rural EGS programs gen 
erate both income support for the poor as well as raise agricultural productivity over the long
run (Dr` eze, 1990). As examples, the EGS in Maharashtra has been credited with averting a
famine during the drought of 1970   73, and alleviating poverty (Dr` eze, 1990 and Dandekar,
1986) while the Rural Public Works (RPW) program in Bangladesh has been commended for
its contribution to rural development and increased agricultural production through the cre 
ation and maintenance of rural infrastructure (Alamgir, 1983). In this context, the NREGS can
be thought of as a policy to boost rural income, stabilize agricultural production and reduce
rural urban migration.
1See for example, Ravallion (1990 & 1991), Ravallion, Datt and Chaudhuri (1993).
1The NREGS is initially applicable in 200 rural districts and encompass all rural areas of In 
dia including the Fifth and Sixth Schedule areas, except the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
Some of the provisions of the NREGS are: (i) every household in the rural areas of India shall
have a right to at least 100 days of guaranteed employment every year for at least one adult
member for doing casual manual labour at the rate of Rupees 60 per day (approximately US
$1.30 per day); (ii) only productive works shall undertaken: the identiﬁcation of projects will
be based on the economic, social and environmental beneﬁts of diﬀerent types of works, their
contribution to social equity, and their ability to create permanent assets; and (iii) employment
will be provided within a radius of 5 kilometers of the village where the applicant resides at
the time of applying. Moreover, the NREGS allows for any existing EGS to be deemed as the
action plan for purposes of the Act. Existing EGS programs, however, have stricter workfare
guidelines as compared to the broader scope of the NREGS elucidated above. For instance,
the EGS in Maharashtra speciﬁes that (a) large scale employment is to be provided to landless
laborers during the lean (or slack) seasons, thereby preventing the out migration of laborers
to the urban regions, (b) construct and maintain rural infrastructure, viz, irrigation facilities,
ﬂood control measures and roads, (c) encourage farmers to invest in cultivation so as to fulﬁll
the objective of self suﬃciency in foodgrains, and (d) public works employment should not af 
fect the availability of agricultural labor at lawful minimum wages (Dandekar and Sathe, 1980).
Although the design and eﬃcacy of public works programs as an instrument for poverty allevi 
ation has been a subject of extensive theoretical research2, the eﬀect of such programs on rural
labor market outcomes and agricultural production decisions has received surprisingly little
attention. Notable exceptions to the latter has been the work of Ravallion (1990) and Khan
(1993), which recognizes that EGS programs have ramiﬁcations in both the output as well as
the labor markets. However, both these papers analyze market responses to EGS programs in
the context of a dual economy characterized by a perfectly competitive rural labor market and
urban unemployment ` a la Harris Todaro3. While agrarian relations in rural India exhibit a va 
riety of labor hiring arrangements – from active casual markets in both seasons, to tied labor
/ implicit contracts to collective bargaining between laborers and landlords – the explicit and
implicit objectives of the EGS and NREGS programs (highlighted above respectively) is to
2Some of the studies that revolve around the poverty alleviation aspect of EGS programs are: (a) the
incentive argument of public works programs, speciﬁcally, the self targeting and screening potential of these
programs (Besley and Coate (1992)), (b) the use of means tested and universal schemes in the alleviation of
poverty (Besley (1990)), (c) schemes aiming at wide coverage at low wages and restricted coverage at higher
wages (Ravallion (1991)), (d) transfer beneﬁts from public works employment (Datt and Ravallion (1994)) and
(e) the relative beneﬁts of payments in cash or kind through these programs (Kaushik Basu (1981 & 1990)).
3Following Harris and Todaro’s (1970) classic formulation.
2target those laborers that are either involuntarily unemployed in the agricultural lean season
or those that are desperate to escape the vicious cycle of poverty and debt. Thus, competi 
tive rural labor market framework, given program objectives highlighted above, is hardly the
suitable one for the purpose of analyzing agricultural labor market outcomes in the presence
of either an NREGS or an EGS.
Two types of laborers, those either vulnerable to debt bondage (through interlinked credit 
labor contracts) or potential participants in tied labor contracts (which generates involuntary
unemployment in the lean season), ﬁts best as the intended beneﬁciaries of the NREGS and
EGS programs. Consider the institution of debt bondage ﬁrst. Absent formal credit markets
in rural areas, debt bondage is a phenomenon where poor laborers borrow from richer land 
lords to ﬁnance subsistence consumption in the lean season with the pledge to repay the loan
through labor services in the peak season. While these contracts are entered into voluntarily
by poor laborers, usurious interest rates force them into a vicious cycle of debt. Frequently
these laborers have no choice but to pledge the labor services of their children (in addition to
their own labor services) in order to repay these loans. The phenomenon of debt bondage for
adult laborers has been studied by Genicot (2002), and for adult and child laborers by Basu
and Chau (2003 and 2004). Basu and Chau (2003) explicitly consider the impact of an EGS
program to alleviate debt bondage, and show that while an EGS program may well be eﬀective
in targeting potential laborers from entering into such repressive credit labor arrangements, a
policy of subsidized credit may well be a more eﬀective instrument in targeting potential and
existing laborers vulnerable to debt bondage.
The discussion above leaves the framework of two tiered labor markets as the remaining one
that is yet to be used for the evaluation of labor market outcomes in the presence of employ 
ment guarantee programs. To begin with, labor tying is usually observed where agricultural
production exhibit seasonality as deﬁned by low labor demand during the lean/slack season
(dominated by activities like soil preparation, tilling and sowing) and usually high labor de 
mand during the peak season (when the crop is harvested, threshed and stored/marketed).
The presence of this production uncertainty, in turn, induces landlords to lock in of a certain
number of laborers at a pre determined wage over both seasons to minimize production costs.
Such locking in of laborers still allows for the option to supplement tied laborers with casual
ones at the competitive wage in the peak season if actual peak season production does end up
3exceeding the anticipated level in the lean season (Bardhan 1979, 1983)4. A direct consequence
of labor tying (with an inactive casual labor market in the lean season) is involuntary unem 
ployment – the explicit target group for the EGS and the implicit target of the NREGS to
provide a hundred days of guaranteed employment.
Indeed, evidence suggests that tied labor contracts (with accompanying involuntary unemploy 
ment) still exist in rural India. Although historically the Indian States of Bihar (including the
State of Jharkhand) and Uttar Pradesh (including the State of Uttaranchal) had some of the
highest incidence of attached or tied labor (Bardhan 1983), more recently tied labor is shown
to be more pervasive in the Indian States of Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and
Punjab. Using data from the Consumption Expenditure of Rural Labour Households survey
of the Government of India (1999 2000), Deshingkar and Farrington (2006) show that in the
State of Andhra Pradesh attached laborers are on yearly contracts and the demographic pro 
ﬁle is almost exclusively male and between the ages of 10 70. The primary reason for a high
percentage of attached or tied labor in Andhra Pradesh is due to a poor household’s need for
credit to pay oﬀ outstanding debt. Further, these attached labor contracts are entered into
voluntarily and their incidence increases during the periods of draught which points to these
contracts as an insurance mechanism. A similar pattern of attached labor is also found in
Madhya Pradesh where feudal agrarian relations have led to the bonded labor contracts called
Hali. These contracts entail an advance of a full season’s wages in lieu of a laborer working
a certain number of hours for a particular landlord, and these wage advances are positively
correlated with the prevailing agricultural wage. Attached labor contracts are also observed
amongst the lower caste landless households in Rajasthan (Bhasin, 2004), as well as amongst
migrant laborers in Punjab who are on annual contracts. Incidentally in Punjab, although the
proportion of attached laborers to casual laborers is less than one, this proportion increases
with the size of the land holdings (Singh et.al, 2007). Finally, village level studies by Motiram
(2007) in the Telangana region of South India and by Rawal (2006) in rural Haryana also points
to the existence of tied and attached laborers in these regions.
Unfortunately, comprehensive studies aimed at identifying the percentage of tied labor across
4Bardhan (1979) posits that labor tying arrangements of this nature stems from the landlords’ motive to
minimize recruitment costs in the peak season when labor demand is usually high. Bardhan (1983) provides
an alternative hypothesis in that production uncertainty, coupled with the absence of insurance markets, enable
landlords to oﬀer contracts that ensure a certain income for risk averse laborers. A third hypothesis revolves
around the notion that laborers have an incentive to shirk, and hence contractual arrangements that guarantees
a remuneration above a laborers’ opportunity income may elicit loyalty (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985).
4individual rural districts within the various States of India, and the corresponding district level
implementation of the NREGS programs to ascertain the degree to which these programs are
targeted towards tied laborers, do not yet exist. Nevertheless, it is important to map the con 
centration of NREGS programs across the Indian states to check whether a relatively higher
number of these programs have, at the very least, been instituted in those States where the
institution of tied labor has been reported by existing studies. In this regard, Chakraborty
(2007) provides a comprehensive picture of the number of NREGS districts in each Indian
State. The highest concentration of NREGS programs are in Bihar (23 districts), Uttaranchal
(22 districts), Jharkhand (20 districts), Orissa (19 districts), Madhya Pradesh (18 districts),
Andhra Pradesh (13 districts), Maharashtra (12 districts), West Bengal (10 districts), and Ra 
jasthan, Kerala and Gujarat (6 districts each). Interestingly, Andhra Pradesh is also the State
with one of the highest reported incidence of debt bondage along with the States of Orissa,
Uttar Pradesh and Karnataka for both agricultural and non agricultural rural workers. Debt
bondage, however, is observed to a lesser extent in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Punjab
(Srivastava, 2005).
In light of the above, the main objective in this paper is to trace out the labor and output mar 
ket responses to an EGS program instituted in the lean season to hire the rural unemployed
and produce a public input. We consider a model of labor tying that is a generalization of
Bardhan’s (1979) model in which monopsonistic landlords minimize recruitment costs by of 
fering tied labor contracts. In our model, risk neutral, oligopsonistic landlords hire risk averse,
landless laborers to produce a single crop. The production of this crop is spread over two
seasons, the lean and the peak with the peak season output subject to ﬂuctuations in weather.
Based on their expectation about peak season output, landlords choose the number of laborers
to be hired as attached or permanent laborers at a ﬁxed wage over the two seasons thereby
giving rise to the institution of tied labor contracts. If the peak season weather turns out to be
better than expected, landlords supplement the need for additional labor through the hiring of
casual laborers at the prevailing spot market wage.
The intuition behind the persistence of tied labor contracts in the above setting follows from
the fact that landlords, by accounting for the trade oﬀ between the number of permanent hires
and the peak season recruitment cost in their expected proﬁt maximization calculus, oﬀer per 
manent contracts at a wage that equates the value of the expected marginal revenue product
of labor with the marginal cost of hiring over both seasons. Consequently, the permanent
5wage and the number of contracts oﬀered is less than what obtains under a competitive setting
leading to involuntary unemployment in the lean season5. In the absence of any alternative
employment opportunities, laborers who fail to get permanent contracts rely solely on the com 
petitive casual labor market to ﬁnd agricultural employment in the peak season6. In the lean
season, a productive EGS program fulﬁlls the ﬁrst of its three objectives by employing this
group of otherwise unemployed laborers. Naturally, government hiring of unemployed laborers
would aﬀect labor allocations across both seasons directly through its eﬀect on the wages and
indirectly through its eﬀect on peak season output.
A second important dimension of these EGS programs, hitherto neglected in the literature
when accounting for market responses to public interventions, relates to their productive na 
ture. It can be argued, inter alia, that productive assets or infrastructure created through an
EGS program in the rural sector will have a direct impact on agricultural productivity as a
public input. Indeed, if EGS were to undertake projects on irrigation or ﬂood control measures
in areas prone to droughts or ﬂooding, it is only natural that output and labor hiring decisions
takes into account the eﬀect of these projects in mitigating such factors as weather ﬂuctuations
which customarily plague agricultural production. In fact, empirical studies by Binswanger,
Khandker and Rosenzweig (1993) and Fan, Hazell and Thorat (2000) strongly suggest a pos 
itive relationship between government investment in infrastructure and agricultural output7.
5Tied labor contracts can also be generated in other settings, such as Eswaran and Kotwal’s (1985) model
where tied contracts circumvent shirking by laborers. However, since the focus of our paper is about EGS
programs that are the employer of the last resort, it is diﬃcult to justify that landless laborers, with no alternative
source of income, have an incentive to shirk if they ﬁnd regular agricultural employment. Second, the choice of
our framework is dictated by the observation that EGS programs guarantee jobs for only those unemployed in
the agricultural sector and hence, unlike Mukherjee and Ray (1995), our framework precludes the existence of
an active casual labor market in the lean season. It should also be noted, that the assumption regarding output
uncertainty in this model is based on the realistic production environment in South Asia and is not necessary
for the emergence & persistence of tied labor contracts. The assumption of oligopsony is suﬃcient for this
purpose. In fact, in our model output uncertainty by itself will not lead to the prevalence of tied labor contracts
in an unfettered economy, unless additional assumptions are made regarding the production technology (see, for
example, Bardhan 1983 and Basu, 2002).
6We assume that laborers in this economy have no other source of income except from that of either as
an agricultural laborer or as an EGS employee. This assumption follows from the fact that EGS programs
are directed primarily towards the rural landless as evidenced by the implementation of the Rural Landless
Employment Guarantee Scheme under the seventh ﬁve year plan (1985 1990) in India as well as a number of
other programs such as the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana in 1989. Further, the extent of unemployment amongst
landless agricultural laborers is signiﬁcant in India (India Rural Development Report, 1999 and Mearns, 2000).
7Binswanger et.al points out that private agricultural investment and input use is more proﬁtable the better
the government infrastructure. Fan, Hazell and Thorat ﬁnds that investments in rural roads and agricultural
research have the highest impact per rupee spent than any other government investment on agricultural produc 
tivity. Further evidence linking agricultural productivity with investment in rural infrastructure can be found in
Thomas (1971) which suggests that yearly yields of paddy had increased as a result of the Rural Public Works
program in Bangladesh. See also Narayana et.al (1988) for an empirical analysis of the costs and beneﬁts of
6Additionally, Sathe (1991) reports that 91% of ex EGS laborers ﬁnd that rural employment
guarantee schemes contributed to formal agricultural activity through work on protective irri 
gation to otherwise dry lands, and these assets created through EGS employment had led to
positive developments in agricultural and rural non agricultural activities.
In eﬀect, our theoretical framework allows for an evaluation of a number of (sometimes) con 
ﬂicting observations and empirical results on the impact of an EGS on agricultural wages,
employment and output, as well as underscores the importance of the relative productivity of
workers in the EGS program vis-` a-vis their counterparts engaged in agricultural production
in determining the success of these programs. As examples, Osmani and Chowdhury (1983)
and Basu (1982) posit for Bangladesh and India respectively, that an EGS program exerts
upward pressure on agricultural wages while Ravallion (1990) and Ahmad and Hossain (1985)
show that an EGS displaces laborers from agricultural employment. We show that while the
institution of an EGS program increases the permanent wage and displaces some permanent
laborers into the pool of casual ones, the impact of an EGS program on the casual wage in the
peak season may well be positive depending upon the relative productivity of the EGS laborers
vis-` a-vis their agricultural counterparts.
The ﬁnal objective of our paper concerns the determination of the optimum wage to be paid in
an EGS program taking into account its public good aspect. Although, the NREGS stipulates
Rupees 60 as the daily renumeration for EGS workers, this pre determined wage may well be
inconsistent with one of the following three objectives: (i) screening the poor from the not 
so poor insofar as who gets employed in the program, (ii) maximizing expected agricultural
output and (iii) maximizing the welfare of the laborers in the economy. The ﬁrst objective has
received extensive treatment elsewhere. Our concern is therefore with the second and the third
objectives. It should be noted that the objective of expected agricultural output maximization
is of utmost importance not only because entitlement failures are the consequence of the loss
of employment associated with bad harvests but also because assessments of harvest quality
forms the basis of the annewari system of early warning in India8. Our ﬁndings indicate that
the optimum wage consistent with expected agricultural output maximization almost always
conﬂict with the one consistent with the objective of welfare maximization of the laborers.
Thus, even though a pre determined wage for EGS workers may accidentally fulﬁll one of the
objectives, it is guaranteed to be in conﬂict with the other.
EGS programs in India.
8See Dr` eze (1990).
7The plan of the paper is as follows: section 2 develops the model and explains its workings.
Section 3 analyzes market responses to EGS programs while section 4 focuses on the determina 
tion of the optimum wage. Section 5 provides a sketch of the impact of public works programs
in alternative labor market settings. Finally, section 6 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Landlords
Consider an economy with N identical, risk neutral, oligopsonistic landlords and a large num 
ber, L, of homogeneous, risk averse landless laborers9. The total amount of land is ﬁxed and
equally divided amongst the landlords who maximize proﬁt over an inﬁnite horizon by hiring
landless laborers to produce a single crop. During each time period, the production of this
crop is spread over two seasons, the lean and the peak. Given expectations about weather
conditions in the peak season, an individual landlord maximizes proﬁt by choosing a fraction
of the laborers to be hired as permanent or tied laborers at a ﬁxed wage over the two seasons
at the beginning of any time period. In the peak season, landlords hire casual laborers at the
ongoing spot market wage to supplement permanent laborers10. Further, casual and permanent
laborers perform the same task in the peak season.
Speciﬁcally, lean season output for the ith landlord, Qi
L, is given by,
Qi
L = βLi
P; β > 0 (1)
where β is a technology parameter aﬀecting lean season output and denotes both the average
and the marginal productivity of permanent laborers in the lean season.
The remaining laborers, i. e., the ones who fail to get permanent contracts in the lean season,
are absorbed by a productive EGS program at a pre determined wage,   w, for the creation and
9According to Sathe (1991), data collected through village level surveys in Maharashtra between 1987 1989
for 62 villages and 14345 households shows that half the job seekers in the EGS program were from the backward
castes. In addition, 31% of the sample laborers were landless while 50% were marginal farmers, and 79% of
the respondents alluded to the lack of alternative employment opportunities as the reason for choosing EGS
work. In a recent study on the characteristics of job seekers in the NREGS programs in the State of Rajasthan,
Jha, Bhattacharyya Gaiha and Shanker (2009) also show that members of the scheduled tribes and landless
agricultural workers are the primary beneﬁciaries of these programs.
10Unlike Osmani (1991) and Mukherjee & Ray (1992) laborers in this model do not have bargaining power in
the casual labor market.
8maintenance of rural infrastructure11. We focus on EGS programs that are in eﬀect only over
the duration of the lean season based on (i) the observation that governments try to avoid
competition with farmers over casual labor in the peak season when agricultural labor demand
is usually high (Ravallion, 1990) and (ii) the guarantee of one hundred days of employment
under the NREGS, which most likely will be accessed by the rural poor when the private labor
market is inactive during the lean season12.
Let the shadow cost of public funds used for the EGS program be Π > 0. In other words, each
dollar spent by the government on direct job creation through an EGS program is either (a)
raised through distortionary taxes and costs society (1 + Π) dollars13 or (b) the opportunity
cost of a dollar of foreign aid, not speciﬁcally tied to job creation through an EGS program is
(1 + Π) dollars14.
The production function for the EGS program is given by,
QG = αLG; α > 0 (2)
where α denotes both the marginal and average productivity of labor in this EGS program. By
virtue of the employment guarantee scheme, the allocation of laborers across the EGS program
and private production for the landlords in the lean season must satisfy:
LG + NLi
P = L (3)
where NLi
P is the total number of permanent contracts oﬀered by the landlords.
Denote A ∈ [A,M] as the weather outcome in the peak season, where A and M are respectively
the worst and the best possible weather outcomes. Let F(A) be the cumulative distribution func 
tion associated with the random variable A with f(A) = F′(A) > 0 as the density function15.
11Following Basu (1990), we assume that the government hires, at a pre determined wage, all laborers unable
to ﬁnd permanent contracts. Whether all workers seeking employment in EGS programs actually manage to
ﬁnd employment in Maharashtra has recently been studied by Ravallion, Datt and Chaudhuri (1993).
12Dev (1995, p 126) reports that EGS and agricultural employment are complementary in the sense that EGS
employment is high in the lean season (April   July) and low in the peak season (October   January). For
instance, in two villages within Maharashtra (Shirapur and Kanzara), the EGS and agricultural employment
proﬁles for male agricultural laborers shows negative correlations of  0.68 and  0.33 respectively.
13We are in eﬀect assuming that ideal lump sum taxation is not available and higher the ineﬃciency of tax
collection by the government the higher the value of Π.
14For instance, the Food for Work program in Bangladesh was ﬁnanced by U.S aid under the PL 480 agree 
ment, and is an example of foreign aid tied speciﬁcally to job creation programs (See Alamgir, 1983).
15A ′ denotes the ﬁrst derivative of the variable in question.
9We shall assume that the expectation of A (=
￿ M
A Af(A)dA), equals unity. Now, total output
in the peak season depends on three inputs: (i) lean season output, AβLi
P, comprised of the
work done by permanent laborers, (βLi
P denoting the amount of seeds planted etc.) along with
the actual weather condition at the beginning of the peak season, (A denoting the amount of
rainfall); (ii) the amount of work done in the peak season itself and (iii) the output of the
EGS program,   QG, which plays the role of a public input aﬀecting agricultural production in
the peak season. Therefore, actual peak season output for an individual landlord is written as
follows:
Qi
H = g(   QG)H(AβLi
P, Li
a); E(A) = 1; H1, H2 > 0, H11, H22 < 0 (4)
We shall assume that H( , ) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, exhibits constant returns to
scale and diminishing marginal productivity with respect to both inputs and g(0) = 1 and




N is the total amount of labor employed by an
individual landlord in the peak season with Li
C as the number of casual laborers hired16.
Accordingly, a landlord’s labor hiring decision follows a two stage maximization problem. In
the lean season, employment of permanent labor is determined. In the peak season, casual
labor employment is determined given the prevailing spot wage, wC, the amount of lean season
output, AβLi
P, and the amount of the EGS output,   QG.
With the price of the agricultural output exogenously given and normalized to unity, we shall
begin with the peak season maximization problem of a typical landlord. Given AβLi
P and   QG,
let wi





C ) be the corresponding
casual labor supply to this landlord. Clearly, wi
C = w
j
C for all landlords since a lower wage




wC is the competitive wage for the economy in the peak season due to the fact that under
constant return to scale technologies, Bertrand competition by oligopsonistic landlords leads
to a symmetric competitive outcome. Once wC is determined, the number of casual laborers














The equilibrium casual wage is thus given by










a = L, with NL
i
C is the total number of
casual laborers in the peak season.
10As a ﬁrst step, we need to identify how the number of permanent contracts oﬀered at the
begining of the lean season aﬀects the casual wage in the peak season. To this end, we need
to pin down whether permanent and casual laborers are substitutes or complements of one






(−αNg′H2 + gAβH21 + gH22)
gH22
Since H( , ) exhibits constant returns to scale, we utilize the fact that Li
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< 0 is the elasticity of peak season agricultural output with respect























The right hand side of the above can be either positive or negative implying that permanent
and casual laborers can be either complements or substitutes of one another in the peak season




is small, (ii) weather outcome (A)
is distinctly favorable, (iii) agricultural productivity (β) in the lean season is large and (iv) the
number of permanent laborers relative to the total labor force in the economy is small, then
permanent and casual laborers complement one another. The economic intuition is simple: If
the hiring of an additional permanent laborer has (i) a negligible adverse eﬀect on the output
of the EGS program and hence on the peak season agricultural output, (ii) revealed weather
in the peak season is very good and (iii) if the marginal productivity of permanent laborers is
very high (implying a large intermediate input for the peak season production function), then
the hiring of an additional permanent laborer raises the productivity of all laborers in the peak
leading to an increased need for casual laborers.
Thus, even though the casual labor market clears in the peak season at the prevailing market
wage, the choice of permanent contracts will impinge upon the actual casual wage once weather
conditions are revealed in the peak. In particular,





where the right hand side of the above equation denotes the inverse demand function for casual
labor. Assuming point expectation, i. e., a unique wC for every possible revelation of A, it is
easy to see that the casual wage, wC, is increasing in (i) the number of permanent contracts,
11Li
P, (ii) the productivity of permanent laborers, β, (iii) the amoumt of EGS input generated
in the lean season,   QG and (iv) the revealed weather in the peak season, A.
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is suﬃcient to guarantee that the
hiring of an additional permanent laborer raises casual labor demand thereby generating a pos 
itive relationship between the number of permanent hires in the lean season and the revealed
casual wage in the peak season17.
Laborers
We start by focusing on the availability of permanent and casual labor jobs in the economy
and the corresponding lifetime utilities of the laborers from these jobs. Our framework for the
determination of the lifetime utilities of permanent and casual laborers follows closely that of
Mukherjee and Ray (1995) and Basu (2002). Consider therefore a typical laborer in this econ 
omy at the beginning of the lean season. This laborer has the possibility of either (i) getting a
permanent contract, available with probability p, and an associated wage wP paid at the end
of each season or (ii) not get a permanent contract with probability (1 − p) and work in the
EGS program for wage   w in the lean season and work as a casual laborer for wage wC(A) in
the peak18.
17We shall assume that
d2wC
d(Li
P )2 < 0. Note also that by virtue of symmetry, all landlords hire the same number
of permanent laborers.
18We do not consider the issue of access for laborers to the EGS program. In other words, all laborers willing
to work for an EGS can do so without incurring any transaction costs. Basu, Chau and Kanbur (2009) consider
the scenario where a government may use an EGS program as a rationing device by choice of location.
12Denoting V∗ as the lifetime utility of a laborer and W∗ as the lifetime utility of a laborer
conditional on getting a permanent contract at the beginning of the lean season, we have:




P, β))f(A)dA + ρ2V∗], (7)
W∗ = (1 + ρ)U(wP) + ρ2(1 − q)W∗ + ρ2qV∗, (8)
where U( ) is strictly concave and twice diﬀerentiable with U′ > 0 and U′′ < 0. ρ ∈ (0,1) is
the rate at which laborers discount future utility and q is an exogenously given quit rate from









[(1 − (1 − p)ρ2)(1 + ρ)U(wP) + ρ2q(1 − p)ˆ U],
where |Q| = (1 − ρ2)[(1 − ρ2) + ρ2(q + p(1 − q))] > 0 and ˆ U = U(   w) +
￿ M
A U(wC)f(A)dA.
For a permanent contract to be acceptable to a laborer, it must be the case that W∗ ≥ V∗.
Therefore, the acceptability constraint implies




P,   QG, β))f(A)dA,
otherwise tied labor contracts will never be accepted. However, note that the permanent wage
in the peak season is lower than the expected casual wage since the permanent wage in the
peak season is the certainty equivalent wage oﬀered by landlords, and given that laborers are
risk averse, must be less than the expected casual wage.
Consider now the following possibilities: (1) after having accepted a contract, a permanent
laborer may quit and choose to remain unemployed in the lean season and (2) after having
worked as a permanent laborer in the lean season, a permanent laborer may choose to join the
casual labor pool in the peak season, particularly, when the revealed casual wage is high. The
acceptability constraint guarantees that a permanent laborer will not choose option (1). For
option (2) we again follow Mukherjee and Ray (1995) and Basu (2002) and assume that (i) in
the case of such a deviation, the landlord terminates the contract without any pay for the peak
season and the laborer is returned to the pool of casual laborers and (ii) a permanent laborer
19q is the exogenous probability of nonrenewal of a contract rather than a quit from an ongoing contract (See
Mukherjee & Ray (1995)).
13who reneges on a contract is scarred, i. e., the worker has a lower probability ˜ p of obtaining
a permanent contract the following “year”. The extent to which ˜ p diﬀers from p depends on
the ease with which information regarding a reneger diﬀuses amongst landlords. Denoting the
ease of information diﬀusion by 0 <   < 1, a constant, we have ˜ p = (1 −  )p. Even though
landlords prefer a honest laborer to a reneger, a reneger’s reputation is laundered once he ﬁnds
a permanent contract. Thus, the lifetime utility of a reneger, R∗, at the beginning of the lean
season is
R∗ = ˜ pW∗ + (1 − ˜ p)[U(   w) + ρ
￿ M
A
U(wC)f(A)dA + ρ2R∗]. (9)
First note that V∗ ≥ R∗ and W∗ ≥ R∗. To ensure that a permanent laborer does not have
the incentive to renege, landlords must oﬀer a contract that is incentive-compatible. In other
words, the incentive compatibility constraint must guarantee that the lifetime utility of a honest
permanent worker (W∗) is at least as high as that of a reneger, (R∗). To this end, denote w+
C
as the maximum possible casual wage in the beginning of any peak season consistent with the
best possible weather outcome for a given number of permanent contracts. The discounted
lifetime of a reneger in this scenario is U(w+
C) + ρR∗ while the discounted lifetime utility of
a permanent laborer who chooses not to renege is U(wP) + ρW∗. The incentive compatibility
constraint must therefore guarantee that
U(wP) + ρW∗ ≥ U(w+
C) + ρR∗.
Substituting for W∗ and R∗ in the above equation and rearranging yields20:







ρ(1 − ˜ p)(1 − (1 − p)ρ2)
(1 − (1 − ˜ p)ρ2)[(1 − ρ2) + ρ2(q + p(1 − q))]
> 0
is the factor by which lifetime utility of a permanent worker is discounted. It follows that the
discount factor ν is endogenously determined, depending on Li




The reason behind assumption 1 is as follows. For a laborer with a permanent contract over
two seasons, the discounted present value of lifetime utility of remaining a permanent laborer
20Appendix A.2 provides a formal derivation of the acceptability and incentive compatibility constraints.
14(= ρ[W∗ − V ∗]), is lower if the probability of being hired as a permanent laborer is high. An 
other way to interpret assumption 1 would be that the current period utility from reneging
from a permanent contract (= U(w+
C) − U(wP)), is higher if the probability of being hired as
a permanent laborer is high at the beginning of any lean season21.
Before focusing on the determination of the terms of permanent contracts in the presence of
an EGS, a few observations are in order. First, the incentive compatibility constraint accounts
for all possible revelations of wC for a given number of permanent contracts. Second, it can be
easily checked that if the incentive compatibility binds then W∗ is strictly greater than V∗ or
the lifetime utility of a permanent laborer is strictly greater than that of a casual one. Third,
equation (10) ensures that the permanent wage is the lowest possible incentive compatible wage
and therefore laborers will not be able to undercut the permanent wage, while full employment
in the peak season ensures that laborers will not be willing to undercut the casual wage22.
Fourth,
￿ M
A wCf(A)dA > wP >   w, i. e., the wage paid at the EGS program is the lowest in
the economy. Finally, the probability of getting a permanent contract at the beginning of any
time period or “year” is given simply as the ratio between the number of vacancies to the total
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Noting that the incentive compatibility constraint implies the acceptability constraint, the
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P − ρTC2)f(A)dA;











21Appendix A.3 provides a proof of this result.
22The interested reader is referred to Mukherjee and Ray (1995) for a detailed discussion of the incentive 
compatibility problem that arises when laborers are averse to income ﬂuctuations. As a comparison, Mukherjee
and Ray develop their model of labor tying within a framework characterized by perfectly competitive landlords,
absence of uncertainty and an active casual labor market in the lean season.
15where the peak season casual wage cost is given by
TC2 = wCLi









The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to Li
















wP = λ  (12)
(1 + ρ)Li
P
(1 − ρ)[1 + ν(1 + ρ)]U′(wP)
= λ (13)





C) = 0 (14)
where






















H and p which can be solved using equations (1)   (6) and equations (11)   (13). First,
equations (12) and (13) can be solved simultaneously to obtain the values for Li
P and wP after
substituting for λ into equation (12) from (13). Once Li
P is known, equation (1) determines
Qi
L, equation (2) determines LG and therefore equation (3) determines QG while equation (11)
determines p. Given Li
P, wP and p, λ is determined from equation (13). With Li
P given, wC
as a function of A is determined from equation (5), and hence Li
C is determined from equation
(6). Finally, given Li
C and Li
P, equation (4) can be used to determine Qi
H as a function of A.
We are now in a position to discuss the labor market response to a government intervention
through an EGS program.
3 Labor Market Response to an EGS Program
In this section we analyze the labor market response to a (i) change in the wage paid at the
government EGS program (an increase in   w), (ii) productivity increase of workers in the EGS
program (an increase in α) and (iii) productivity increase (technological improvement) in the
agricultural sector that aﬀects lean season output (an increase in β) . We begin with the
following proposition23:
Proposition 1 An increase in   w leads to an increase in wP, a decrease in LP, a decrease in
QL and an increase in QG. The casual wage in the peak season wC and expected agricultural
23Proofs of all propositions in sections 3 are presented in Appendix B.1. Further, in the notations that follow,
LP = NL
i






C etc., denoting aggregate levels of the variables.
16output, EQH, increases (decreases) if and only if the elasticity of the EGS input in the peak




|), is greater than the elasticity





The intuition behind proposition 1 is as follows: ceteris paribus, an increase in the wage paid
in the EGS program implies, via the incentive compatibility constraint, an increase in the per 
manent wage. This in turn implies a decline in the number of permanent contracts oﬀered
and hence an increase in the pool of laborers seeking casual employment in the peak season.
However, the impact of an EGS wage increase on the peak season casual wage as well as on
expected agricultural output is determined by two opposing forces at play. On one hand, the
displacement of permanent laborers deepens the casual labor pool and would tend to have a
negative impact on both the casual wage as well as expected agricultural output due to loss
in lean season input engendered through the displacement of permanent labor into the casual
pool. This is the displacement eﬀect of an EGS wage increase. On the other hand, a productive
EGS has a positive impact on casual labor demand and expected agricultural output in the
peak season for every value of A through the increase in the EGS input in the lean season.
This is the productivity eﬀect. Recalling that wC = g(   QG)H2(AβLi
P, L
N) from equation (5), if
the elasticity of the EGS input with respect to permanent labor (in absolute value) is greater
than the elasticity of expected agricultural output with respect to permanent labor, the loss in
expected agricultural output (due a decline in lean season output when the number of contracts
fall in response to an increase in   w) is dominated by the increase of the EGS input into the
peak season production function due to an increase in the number of laborers seeking EGS
employment in the lean season. Labor demand in the peak season and casual wages along with
expected agricultural output therefore increases in response to an EGS wage increase.
Proposition 1 is consistent with studies which indicates that implementation of EGS programs
(any positive wage oﬀered for alternative employment) exert upward pressure on average agri 
cultural wages (Osmani & Chowdhury, 1983), and displaces workers from agricultural employ 
ment (Ravallion, 1990 and Ahmad & Hossain, 1985). More speciﬁc to proposition 1, there are
empirical studies subsequent to the May 1988 EGS wage increase in Maharashtra that sheds
light on the forces that might be at play in a two tiered agricultural labor market. The question
of whether this EGS wage hike had an impact on formal agricultural wages and employment
is studied by Dev (1995). According to Dev (1995) average EGS wage in 1976/77 was Rs.2.81
and much less than the average agricultural wage of Rs.13.20. After the EGS wage increase in
1989/90 the average EGS wage of Rs.15.53 exceeded the average agricultural wage of Rs.11.80
17in Maharashtra. Sathe (1991) and Dev (1995) posit that the EGS wage increase in 1988
might have led to an upward pressure on agricultural wages while Sathe (1991) concludes that
agricultural employment increased after the post EGS wage hike although this increase might
have been generated due to increased agricultural productivity as a result of the assets created
through EGS work. In the event that the agricultural sector indeed exhibited a two tiered labor
market, an increase in the EGS wage would increase the permanent wage and decrease number
of permanent contracts. However, focusing on just the competitive casual labor market, the
ensuing increase in the pool of casual laborers would depress the casual wage as a ﬁrst round
eﬀect but the subsequent increase in agricultural productivity due to the impact of EGS work
could well dominate this ﬁrst round eﬀect to show an overall increase in the casual wage in the
peak season24.
Nevertheless, it bears emphasis that empirical studies conducted after the EGS wage increase in
Maharashtra in 1988 implicitly assume a competitive agricultural labor market even though a
variety of labor hiring arrangements are likely to be prevalent within the State of Maharashtra.
As such, the empirical results delineated above after the 1988 EGS wage increase should not
be interpreted as either a reinforcement or a rejection of our theoretical ﬁndings based on a
two tiered labor market structure. However, our proposition above with regards to the impact
of an EGS wage increase on just the peak season competitive agricultural wage and employment
can well be observationally consistent with the above empirical studies. It is worth noting here
that even in the absence of or a minimal impact on agricultural productivity in the peak season
through EGS work done in the lean season, demand for casual labor may well increase due to
a positive weather shock – a variable ignored by prior empirical studies / surveys that aimed
at estimating the impact of an EGS wage on agricultural wages and employment.
We next turn to the question of how productivity changes in the EGS program, and in the
agricultural sector impact labor market responses. First, consider an increase in the productiv 
ity of laborers in the EGS program. As a starting point, suppose that ǫQG
α > 0, or the output
24However, Datt and Ravallion (1994) found that the average monthly expenditure on EGS programs fell
after the wage hike and employment in these programs fell by a third pointing to employment rationing in
the EGS programs after the wage increase and that the increase in the EGS wage did not have an impact on
agricultural wages. The issue of rationing in EGS employment is analyzed theoretically by Basu, Chau and
Kanbur (2009) where the government jointly maximizes the EGS wage and access to EGS employment given
an aggregate employment target. Basu, Chau and Kanbur show that the credibility of such an employment
target is endogenously determined by a host of factors (distributional concern of the planner and private sector
productivity, amongst others). An explicit model of employment rationing in EGS programs either through
access or changes in budgetary outlay is beyond the scope of this paper.
18elasticity of the EGS program is positive with respect to a technological change. In this case,
seasonal labor markets and agricultural output responds according to,
Proposition 2 An increase in α increases wP, LP, QL, and increases wC if the elasticity of
the marginal product of EGS input in peak season agricultural production with respect to QG
(ǫ
g′
QG) is close to negative unity. If in addition, the elasticity of expected agricultural output




is greater than the elasticity of the EGS input in the peak




|, then EQH increases.
Proposition 2 indicates that a yield increasing improvement in technology originating from the
government project increases the number of permanent contracts if ǫ
g′
QG → −1. The reason
being that if landlords hire less permanent workers in the lean season under the above suﬃcient
condition, the negative impact of the lean season agricultural output dominates the positive
impact of an increase in the productivity of the EGS output on agricultural production in the
peak season. This results in a decline in expected agricultural output. Therefore, the number
of permanent contracts must rise in response to productivity increases in the EGS program to
prevent a decline in expected agricultural output. The increase in the number of permanent
contracts increases lean season agricultural output, and tightens the pool of casual laborers
which causes an increase in the casual wage. Furthermore, the increase in the casual wage
entails an increase in the permanent wage via the incentive compatibility constraint.
Consider now the impact of a productivity increase aﬀecting lean season agricultural production
on labor hiring decisions and expected agricultural output. Suppose that at the beginning of the
lean season there is, say, an increase in the usage of inputs such as fertilizers and/or increased
mechanization that has a positive eﬀect on the productivity of permanent workers. Then25





> −1 and (ii) the elasticity of the marginal product of lean season output (in the peak




) is close to zero. If in addition, the elasticity of
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is suﬃciently large, then an increase in
β leads to an increase in expected agricultural output even when the number of permanent
25We shall assume for simplicity that ǫ
QL
β , the elasticity of lean period output with respect to technological
change aﬀecting its output is positive.
19contracts fall. This happens because the increase in the EGS input into the peak season agri 
cultural production due to a larger number of laborers seeking EGS employment is more than
suﬃcient to outweigh the fall in peak season agricultural production caused by a decline in
lean season agricultural output due to a fewer number of permanent laborers. A fewer number
of permanent laborers in turn increases the pool of casual laborers and depresses the casual
wage for every value of A. For the incentive compatibility constraint to hold in equilibrium, a





> −1, the number of permanent laborers hired increases, and the subsequent increase
in the lean season output overweighs the fall in the EGS input leading to an increase in ex 




> −1, proposition 3 is consistent with the
empirical ﬁndings of Bardhan (1983) which demonstrates a positive correlation between land
productivity and the number of permanent contracts.
The labor and output market responses to changes in the above three parameters has interesting
implications for policy formulations. Conditional on the way in which labor demand in the two
seasons vary in accordance with changes in the policy instruments, a natural question arises
as to whether by directly improving the income of the rural unemployed or indirectly through
(a) raising the productivity of EGS programs and/or (b) inducing technological change in
the agricultural sector, will the interests of the poor be best served. We conjecture that an
indirect mechanism in the form of inducing technological improvement in the agricultural sector
increases the income of the laborers relative to a direct policy such as raising the wage paid








> −1 and (iii) ǫ
g′
QG → −1. If there
remains an element of uncertainty as to whether induced technological improvement will in
fact take place26, raising the productivity of laborers in the EGS program through an increase
in α would have the same desired eﬀect. In fact, productivity increases in the EGS program
is a superior policy vis a vis wage increases in the program both in terms of improving the
employment opportunities of the laborers as well as through its ability to increase agricultural
production. As propositions 1 and 2 underscore, indirect intervention through an improvement
in the productivity of a EGS program has a positive impact on agricultural production as
compared to a direct increase in the EGS wage if the elasticity of expected agricultural output




) is greater than the elasticity of the EGS input in the
26It might very well be the case that landlords voluntarily refuse to undertake technological change aﬀecting
lean season output since such an increase corresponds to a higher wage bill and might end up reducing the
proﬁt margin. For instance, Braverman & Stiglitz (1986) analyzes whether such technological innovations are
undertaken by landlords in the context of share tenancy contracts.




|). Indeed, as we shall
point out in the next section, even when funds for an EGS program are unlimited, indirect
intervention might prove to be a better option.
4 Determination of the Optimum Wage
Existing theoretical models due to Ravallion (1990) and Khan (1993) analyze market responses
to EGS programs by assuming that laborers working in an EGS project are paid the ongo 
ing wage in the agricultural sector. Basu (1990), on the other hand, has shown that wages
paid at the EGS in Maharashtra and the RPW program in Bangladesh has been too low and
ought to be raised to the point where the minimum compensation to an EGS employee equates
the potential employment schedule27 with the labor supply schedule for the EGS program. A
minimum wage determined in this fashion, while guaranteeing self selection amongst the poor
and not so poor in so far as the question of who should be employed in an EGS program is
concerned, may be inadequate to achieve the objective of, say, agricultural output maximiza 
tion. Clearly then, the nature of such an appropriate wage depends on the objective which the
government wishes to pursue.
As stated in the Introduction, an important objective of EGS programs that is particularly
relevant in the context of poverty alleviation is to maximize agricultural production that ensures
the availability of food and reduces the dependence on imports. Thus, a wage   wo, which achieves
the goal of expected agricultural output maximization net of the shadow cost of public funds














C) is the total private output of the economy; NLi
C =
L − NLi
P = LG and g(QG) = g(α(L − NLi
P)) is the EGS input in agricultural production.
Provided that the second order conditions are fulﬁlled, the ﬁrst order condition corresponding
























¯ w ) = 0
27If the total amount of funds available for relief work is X, then given a wage G the maximum number of
laborers that can be employed is simply X/G. The schedule that traces out this relationship for diﬀerent values
of G is the potential employment schedule.

























where δR > 0 if and only if   w > 0 and equals the share of EGS outlays per unit of expected











is the elasticity of the EGS output with respect to permanent labor and is negative
(the higher the number of permanent laborers hired, the lower the number of laborers




¯ w is the elasticity of casual labor with respect to the EGS wage and is positive (the
higher the EGS wage the lower the number of permanent laborers hired by virtue of the
incentive compatibility constraint, resulting in a larger number of casual laborers seeking




¯ w is the elasticity of permanent hires with respect to the EGS wage and is negative.
Two comments are in order. First, equation (15) captures the fact that an EGS program should








) is negative. Second, equation (15) also captures
the fact that if the elasticity of expected agricultural output with respect to permanent labor is
low then, as indicated by our results in proposition 1, the wage compensation to EGS laborers
should be relatively high so as to attract a larger number of laborers to the EGS program and
vice versa when the expected elasticity of output with respect to permanent labor is high. It
can easily be checked that the optimal level of productivity for an EGS and for the agricultural
sector (α and β) respectively that maximizes expected output is given by same condition as in
equation (15).
A second, yet perhaps more direct objective to follow is one which maximizes the ex-ante
expected lifetime welfare of a new laborer joining the labor market in the economy. Such a
laborer could either become a permanent laborer with probability p or a casual laborer with




[p(1 + ρ)U(wP) + (1 − p)(1 − (1 − q)ρ2)ˆ U]
22where ˆ U = U(   w) + ρ
￿ M
A U(wC)f(A)dA and |Q| = (1 − ρ2)[(1 − ρ2) + ρ2(q + p(1 − q))] > 0.
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j > 0; j = wP,wC and   w is the elasticity of utility with respect to the permanent, casual
and the EGS wage respectively,
• ǫ
wP
¯ w is the elasticity of the permanent wage with respect to the EGS wage and is positive
since an increase in the wage paid at the EGS program engenders an increase in the
permanent wage to preserve the incentive compatibility constraint,
• ǫ
p
LP is the elasticity of the probability of ﬁnding employment as a permanent laborer with
respect to the number of permanent laborers and is positive. Note that the probability of
ﬁnding employment as a permanent laborer is denoted simply as the ratio of the number
of vacancies to the number of laborers seeking employment as a permanent laborer.
Therefore, an increase in the number of permanent hires, given a ﬁxed quit rate, increases
the number of vacancies while simultaneously reducing the number of job seekers which,
in turn, increases the probability of ﬁnding employment as a permanent laborer.
• ǫ
LP
¯ w is the elasticity of permanent hires with respect to the EGS wage and is negative
since an increase in the EGS wage leads to an increase in the permanent wage and hence
a reduction in the number of permanent laborers hired,
• ǫ
wC
LP is the elasticity of the casual wage with respect to the number of permanent laborers
and is positive since an increase in the number or permanent hires tightens the casual
labor market and leads to an increase in the market clearing casual wage.
Equation (16) captures the fact that the optimum wage consistent with the maximization of
the ex ante expected lifetime welfare of a laborer must account for two distinct labor market
responses on the ex-post expected lifetime welfare of a laborer. First, those laborers who ﬁnd
28Please refer to the Appendix II.B for a detailed derivation of equation (16).
23employment as permanent ones are better oﬀ since the permanent wage increases in response to
an increase in the EGS wage. However, the probability of ﬁnding employment as a permanent
laborer falls since the decline in the number of permanent hires subsequent to an increase in
the permanent wage implies fewer vacancies in equilibrium. Second, the ensuing increase in
the number of casual laborers implies a lower market clearing casual wage in the peak season
which, depending upon the elasticity of the casual wage with respect to permanent labor and
the elasticities of the utility function with respect to the casual and the EGS wage, may ac 
tually make a casual laborer worse oﬀ. For instance, if both the elasticity of the probability
of employment as a permanent laborer with respect to the number of permanent hires and
the elasticity of the number of permanent hires with respect to the EGS wage are large, then
there is a large displacement of permanent laborers caused by an increase in the EGS wage.
This displacement eﬀect coupled with a high elasticity of the casual wage with respect to the
number of permanent hires would tend make a casual laborer worse oﬀ. In this case   wv should
be kept very low in order to ensure that the number of permanent laborers displaced is very
small.
As a third objective, the government might want to maximize the expected welfare of casual
workers (the poorest in this economy) at any given time period. Such an optimum government
wage,   wu, consistent with the objective of expected welfare maximization of casual workers can
be deduced as a solution to
U(   wu)ǫu






¯ w ). (17)
That   wo,   wv and   wu may not be consistent with the objectives of maximizing expected agri 
cultural output and the ex ante expected lifetime welfare of a laborer (either a potentially new
entrant to the labor force or a casual one) should be clear from equations (15), (16) and (17). To
see this, consider for instance the extreme case where the EGS program is unproductive, i. e.,
the government hires the rural unemployed in the lean season to build roads and bridges which
get washed away. In terms of our model, peak season output QH is then independent of   QG. It
is easy to see that the optimum wage paid for the EGS program consistent with the objective of
















¯ w is negative, the optimum wage should be zero. This is what one should expect since an
unproductive EGS program only serves to displace laborers away from agriculture and hence
agricultural output must fall as the EGS program competes with landlords for laborers. On
the other hand, a zero wage for instance, which is perfectly justiﬁable in the event where the
24EGS program should not interfere with agricultural production decisions, cannot be one which
simultaneously maximizes the welfare of a laborer in this economy.
A ﬁnal criteria that a government might wish to pursue through the institution of EGS programs
is to explicitly address poverty alleviation – specially for the casual laborers whose annual
income is subject to considerable income variability in the presence of production uncertainty.
Consider therefore the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) Pα index of poverty for the casual





z − (   w + wC)
z
}α
where z is the poverty line, (  w + wC) is the annual income of the casual laborers from EGS
and peak season employment combined and LC
L is the fraction of the casual laborers in the
economy. Diﬀerentiating the above equation with respect to the EGS wage   w and simplifying
we have
dPα







α   w
z − (   w + wC)
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)] > (<) 0
In general the impact of an EGS wage increase on the poverty index of casual laborers is
indeterminate since the elasticity of casual labor supply with respect to the EGS wage, ǫ
LC
¯ w , is
negative while dwc
d ¯ w can be either positive or negative. However, if the if the elasticity of the










) then casual wages increase with an increase in the EGS wage, and the poverty index
for casual laborers unambiguously falls. Once again, the relative productivity of EGS laborers
vis-` a-vis their agricultural counterparts play a crucial role in determining how eﬀective an EGS
program is in alleviating poverty.
5 NREGS / EGS in Alternative Labor Market Settings
Given that a variety of labor hiring arrangements exist in rural India, we sketch the the po 
tential impact of an EGS on agricultural employment and wages under some alternative labor
hiring mechanisms.
Collective Bargaining: In a recent paper, Dasgupta (2009) models an economy with two
labor unions (an advanced and a backward class) simultaneously contesting a legislated mini 
mum wage against a single employer and higher employment shares against each other. Such
25a model, at least within India, is more applicable to Indian States like Kerala where labor
unions are strong and collective bargaining laws are enforced more regularly as compared to
Indian States like Bihar and Orissa. In fact, an empirical study undertaken by Shanmugam
and Vijayalakshmy (2005) in Palakkad district in Kerala and Nagapattinam district of Tamil
Nadu shows that education and income from non agricultural activities were the most signif 
icant factors inﬂuencing the labor union participation by the laborers. Nevertheless, the key
idea in Dasgupta (2009) is that a landlord hires workers from both the advanced and backward
caste groups, and the maximum per worker wage that a landlord can pay,   W, is greater than
the reservation wage of the both the advanced (wA) and backward (wB) caste workers (or
  W > wA > wB). Consider now the case of a government mandated minimum wage w which
a landlord would like to evade, and hire only workers from the backward caste with the lower
reservation wage wB. However, both the advanced and the backward caste unions contest this
minimum wage against the common employer, as well as against each other to increase the
employment share for members within each union.
Such a wage contestation model between two groups of workers for a higher share of employ 
ment at a mandated minimum wage provides some interesting propositions. First, an increase
in the reservation wage of either group of workers beneﬁts the other group in terms of a higher
share of employment at the minimum wage w. Second, an increase in the minimum wage w
itself beneﬁts workers of the advanced caste as the expense of the backward caste in terms of
a higher employment share. In order to understand these propositions in a parsimonious way,
Dasgupta’s model assumes the minimum wage to belong within the range of the maximum
wage that a landlord is willing to pay a worker and the reservation wage of the advanced caste,
or w ∈ [wA,   W]. Workers belonging to each caste invest a fraction of the diﬀerence between
the minimum wage and their reservation wage to contest non cooperatively against each other,
and against the landlord for a higher employment share. Since, w − wA < w − wB, the union
representing the backward caste workers contest the minimum wage relatively more intensely.
In Dasgupta’s framework above, consider now the case of an EGS that not only guarantees a
wage but also employment to workers of either caste. Depending on the EGS wage, we, relative
to the reservation wage of the two groups of workers we can sketch some cursory results:
(i) we < wB < wA <   W: This is a trivial case where the institution of an EGS at a wage lower
than the reservation wage of the backward caste workers has no eﬀect on class conﬂict. Both
26unions will still invest in contesting the other and the landlord for a higher employment share
at the agricultural wage   W.
(ii) wB ≤ we < wA <   W: When the EGS wage is greater than or equal to the reservation wage
of the backward caste, the advanced caste beneﬁts in terms of a higher employment share in
agricultural work. The result follows from the fact that the union representing the backward
caste will invest less in contesting the agricultural wage both because the gap between   W −we
is smaller and they can also ﬁnd guaranteed EGS employment at we ≥ wB.
(iii) wB < wA ≤ we <   W: When the EGS wage is greater than or equal to the reservation wage
of the advanced class workers, both unions reduce their investment in contesting the agricul 
tural wage (with a relatively greater reduction for the backward caste workers). This situation
also beneﬁts the advanced caste in terms of a higher share of employment in agricultural work.
Thus an EGS has the potential to attract backward class workers and reduce inter caste con 
ﬂict but it also has the potential for increasing the employment share of the advanced caste
in agricultural work. Nevertheless, extension of this basic model to a situation where unions
representing the advanced and backward classes contest the agricultural wage in the presence
of seasonal labor markets (in the lean as well as the peak) requires accounting for the trade oﬀ
of employment shares across the two seasons by the unions. In such a situation, reduction
in inter caste conﬂict during the lean season thanks to an EGS, specially case (iii) above,
might well imply an escalation of conﬂict in the peak season if unions can divert resources
saved in the lean season towards intensifying contestation of the agricultural wage in the peak.
Perhaps more interesting is the case where absent collective bargaining laws, an EGS by pro 
viding a threat point can induce lobby formation amongst workers to negotiate higher wages
with landlords. Needless to say, a formal analysis of the above is beyond the scope of this paper.
Aside from selected areas in the States of Kerala and Tamil Nadu, collective bargaining laws
in rural India are seldom enforced, and workers have little recourse to contesting the mandated
minimum wage. Yet, as Osmani (1991) notes, agricultural wages in rural India are sometimes
higher than the competitive wage, and more interestingly workers resist this wage to be pushed
down to the competitive level even in the presence of unemployment.
Implicit Contracts: Osmani (1991) models a situation where workers bid for a wage from
a given distribution of wages, and an individual worker’s wage bid depends on his perception
of the probability of ﬁnding employment at that wage. The probability of ﬁnding employment
27for an individual worker depends, in turn, on how many workers actually bid a lower wage. In
other words, the probability of ﬁnding employment for an individual worker depends on the
wage bids by all workers. Thus an individual worker’s payoﬀ (P) from a wage bid (wi) equals
Pi( ˜ w) = θi( ˜ w)wi + (1 − θi( ˜ w)ci
where ˜ w is the distribution of wage bids, θi is the probability of ﬁnding employment and ci
is the opportunity income for this worker. Assuming all workers are identical and have the
same opportunity income, a non cooperative inﬁnite period game with punitive actions in the
future (trigger strategy) by workers against an individual who undercuts the equilibrium wage
in any given period yields a Nash equilibrium wage that is higher than the competitive one
(which equals the opportunity income, c, of the workers). Needless to say, the afore mentioned
equilibrium Nash outcome generates random involuntary unemployment for any worker at any
given period. Yet, and because of the trigger strategy, no worker has the incentive to undercut
the ongoing wage. In this case, institution of an EGS that pays the involuntarily unemployed
a little more than the opportunity income c will lead to an upward pressure on the agricultural
wage as all workers adjust their wage bids upward.
Co-existence of Permanent and Casual Contracts in both Seasons: Based on the
observation that in some areas of rural India, permanent and casual contracts co exist in both
the lean and the peak season, Mukherjee and Ray (1995) and Pal (2002) posit that the existence
of tied labor contracts are an outcome of landlord’s minimizing hiring costs in the casual market
in each season. In other words, labor hoarding through tied contracts is a way to circumvent
high casual season labor costs. The situation considered (see Pal (2002), for instance) is one
where casual wages are low in the lean season and high in the peak season in a seasonal labor
market. If casual wages are very low in the lean season then the rural labor market would be
characterized by just a competitive casual labor market in each season. However, as lean season
competitive wages increase and/or the anticipated casual wage in the peak season is very high,
landlords ﬁnd it cheaper to oﬀer tied labor contracts to some laborers across both seasons. In
equilibrium the permanent wage in each season is greater than the casual wage in the lean
season but lower than the casual wage in the peak season. In other words, wlean
c < wp < wpeak
c
where wp is the permanent wage in each season and wlean
c and wpeak
c are the casual wages
in the lean and the peak season respectively. In this case, an EGS that oﬀers guaranteed
employment at a wage greater than the lean season casual wage will induce landlords to favor
more permanent contracts as laborers would refuse to participate in the lean season casual
labor market for any wage less than the EGS wage.
286 Conclusion
This paper examines the labor and output market responses to a productive rural public works
program and determines the optimum compensation to program employees. By accounting for
the seasonality in agricultural production and the institution of permanent labor contracts,
we have shown that technological change and productivity increases in EGS programs tend to
make laborers better oﬀ as compared to a direct increase in the wage paid at the relief program.
Further, an optimal wage that maximizes expected agricultural output may be in conﬂict with
the one that maximizes the expected lifetime utility of laborers. Trade oﬀs thus exist between
diﬀerent policy objectives. In the event where the elasticity of the EGS input with respect
to permanent laborers is high, a speciﬁc subsidy targeted towards the hiring of permanent
laborers best serves the twin objectives of increased expected agricultural productivity and
increased welfare for the laborers. Finally, we extend our analysis to account for the impact
of EGS programs on a number of other labor hiring mechanisms and point out that an EGS
by introducing contestability in the agricultural labor market can yield a host of interesting
implications for the wage and employment patterns of the rural poor.
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A.1: Relationship between Permanent and Casual Laborers.
An individual landlord maximizes peak season proﬁt, for a given number of permanent laborers, to
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Since H( , ) exhibits constant returns to scale, we utilize the fact that Li
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and high values of A and β, the larger the ratio of the total
labor force to the total number of tied contracts oﬀered, the greater is the possibility that permanent
and casual laborers are complements of one another.
It remains to be shown that if H(AβLi
P,Li
a) exhibits constant returns to scale then Li
PH21+Li
CH22 = 0.
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Consequently, LCH22 + LPH21 = 0.


















































































































The right hand side of the above equation is negative if (i) |ǫ
g′




A.2: Acceptability and Incentive-Compatibility.
First, deﬁne ˆ U = U(   w) + ρ
￿ M
A U(wC)f(A)dA and rewrite equations (7) and (8) as
[1 − (1 − p)ρ
2]V∗ = pW∗ + (1 − p)ˆ U,
and
[1 − (1 − q)ρ2]W∗ = (1 + ρ)U(wP) + ρ2qV∗.
Now solving the above two equations simultaneously from the matrix below
￿
(1 − (1 − p)ρ2) −p







(1 − p)ˆ U












[(1 − (1 − p)ρ2)(1 + ρ)U(wP) + ρ2q(1 − p)ˆ U],
where |Q| = (1 − ρ2)[(1 − ρ2) + ρ2(q + p(1 − q))] > 0. Therefore the acceptability constraint (W∗ ≥ V∗)
implies that (1 + ρ)U(wP) ≥ ˆ U. Now deﬁne the lifetime utility of a reneger as
R∗ =
˜ p
(1 − (1 − ˜ p)ρ2)
W∗ +
(1 − ˜ p)
(1 − (1 − ˜ p)ρ2)
ˆ U.
Therefore,
V∗ − R∗ =
(1 − ρ2) p





W∗ − R∗ =
(1 − ρ2)(1 − ˜ p)





To show that the incentive compatibility constraint implies the acceptability constraint we rewrite the
incentive compatibility constraint, (U(wP) + ρW∗ ≥ U(w
+
C) + ρR∗), as
ν[(1 + ρ)U(wP) − ˆ U] ≥ [U(w
+
C) − U(wP)].
Note that the right hand side of the above equation is strictly positive and therefore the left hand side,
denoting the acceptability constraint and given by (1 + ρ)U(wP) − ˆ U, is also > 0.
31Rearranging the incentive compatibility constraint we get,









Again, since the right hand side of the above equation is strictly positive and as a result, U(wP) > U(   w)
or wP >   w.
We now need to show that wP <
￿ M
A wCf(A)dA. Consider the incentive compatibility constraint from
the beginning of the lean season. Landlords, in this case must choose to oﬀer a permanent wage such
that




Substituting for W∗, V∗ and R∗ we get











U( ˜ wC) =
1 + νρ
1 + ν(1 + ρ)
U(wC(Li
P, A,   QG, β)) +
1 + νρ
1 + ν(1 + ρ)
U(0).
Noting that U is strictly concave and applying Jensen’s inequality we have,
˜ wC <
1 + νρ
1 + ν(1 + ρ)
wC(Li
P, A,   QG, β) < wC(Li
P, A,   QG, β),
since
(1+νρ)
(1+ν(1+ρ)) < 1. In addition, since
￿ M
A U( ˜ wC)f(A)dA = U(wP) if the incentive compatibility














First note that ν is given by
ν =
ρ(1 − ρ2)(1 − ˜ p)(1 − ρ2(1 − p))
|Q|(1 − (1 − ˜ p)ρ2)
.
Substituting for |Q| and in the above equation and deﬁning u = ρ(1 − ˜ p)(1 − (1 − p)ρ2) and v =
(1 − (1 − ˜ p)ρ2)[(1 − ρ2) + ρ2(q + p(1 − q))] we get
∂u
∂p
= −(1 −  )(1 − (1 − p)ρ2) + (1 − ˜ p)ρ2 > (<)0
∂2u
∂p2 = −2(1 −  )ρ2 < 0
∂v
∂p
= [(1 − ρ
2) + ρ
2(q + p(1 − q)](1 −  )ρ
2 + (1 − (1 − ˜ p)ρ
2)ρ
2(1 − q) > 0
∂2v
























































B.1: Market Responses to an EGS program.
Totally diﬀerentiating equations (12) and (14) after substituting for λ from equation (13) into equation


























































































































































































































































































































> 0, j = w
+
C,wC; ǫm




P,QG,wP and rj is the relative risk aversion with respect to the casual wage. It can easily be
checked that ∂λ
∂n, n = Li
P,wP are both positive.






P)2 −ΨP is neg 
ative by the second order condition of proﬁt maximization. With the determinant of the above matrix




d ¯ w < 0, dwP
d ¯ w > 0 and dwC












dα > 0, dwP





dβ > 0, dwP
dβ > 0 and dwC
dβ > 0.
Appendix B.2: Determination of the Optimum Wage.





[p(1 + ρ)U(wP) + (1 − p)(1 − (1 − q)ρ2)ˆ U]
with respect to   wv we get
dV∗






d   w












(1 + ρ)U(wP) − (1 − (1 − q)ρ















d   w
= 0
34Rearranging the above equation and substituting for V∗ yields equation (16).
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